

Message Text

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PAGE 01 USNATO 05307 01 OF 02 242033Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----105050 242044Z /65
O 241957Z MAY 78
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1914
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

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EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

FOR VEST AND NIMETZ FROM SPIERS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, CY, TU
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT IN
BRUSSELS

REF: STATE 131808

1. PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL I MET WITH
PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT AS SCHEDULED MAY 24. ECEVIT
WAS ACCCOMPANIED BY FOREIGN MINISTER OKUN, ELEKDAG
AND TULUMEN. PETER COLLINS OF USNATO ACCCOMPANIED
ME.

2. I TOLD ECEVIT THAT I HAD JUST SPENT SEVERAL DAYS
IN WASHINGTON AND HAD HAD A NUMBER OF DISCUSSIONS
IN THE DEPARTMENT AND IN THE CONGRESS. SECRETARY
VANCE HAD ASKED ME TO COME TO MEET WITH HIM TO GIVE
HIM HIS ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SITUATION IN WASHINGTON.
SECRETARY FEELS - AND MY LIMITED CONVERSATIONS
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OVER LAST FEW DAYS HAVE CONFIRMED - THAT FIGHT FOR
CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF EMBARGO REPEAL CAN BE WON.
I STRESSED THAT PRESIDENT AND ENTIRE ADMINISTRATION
ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE MATTER TO A SUCCESSFUL
CONCLUSION AND TO USE ALL ITS RESOURCES IN THE SERVICE
OF THIS OBJECTIVE. I SAID WE ANTICIPATED THAT FLOOR
ACTION IN BOTH HOUSES WOULD TAKE PLACE IN SECOND

HALF JUNE, AND NOTED THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF HOUSE MEMBERS AND SENATORS IN BOTH PARTIES WHO APPRECIATED IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY AND ARE WORKING HARD ON EMBARGO ISSUE. AT THIS POINT I HANDED HIM A COPY OF MAY 22 LETTER FROM SEVEN HIRC MEMBERS, WHICH HE READ APPRECIATIVELY.

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3. I SAID I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO STRESS THAT WHAT HE SAID OVER NEXT 10 DAYS IN BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUCCESS AND FAILURE. WASHINGTON SUMMIT REPRESENTED A VALUABLE OPPORTUNITY WHICH SHOULD NOT BE MISSED TO FURTHER OUR COMMON EFFORT TO REPEAL EMBARGO. HE WOULD OF COURSE, HAVE TO DECIDE HIMSELF ON WHAT PUBLIC LINE TO TAKE, BUT SECRETARY HOPED VERY MUCH THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO STRESS FOLLOWING THEMES:

(A) HIS BELIEF IN A STRONG NATO IN WHICH TURKEY AND ALL ALLIANCE MEMBERS ARE PLAYING A FULL AND ACTIVE ROLE (I TOLD HIM I HAD TO NOTE WITH FRANKNESS THAT SOME CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORTERS OF EMBARGO REPEAL HAVE RECEIVED IMPRESSION THAT TURKEY MAY BE TO A LIMITED EXTENT, WRITING OFF NATO. ANY DOWNGRADING OF ALLIANCE

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COULD HAVE A MOST UNFORTUNATE EFFECT SINCE IT WOULD UNDERMINE KEY ADMINISTRATION ARGUMENT THAT ITS PROGRAM WILL HELP RESTORE NATO SOUTHERN FLANK).

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(B) WE HOPE HE WILL ALSO STRESS HIS INTEREST IN AN IMPROVED AND REVITALIZED BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. SIMILARLY, WE WOULD RECOMMEND STRESSING HIS DESIRE TO ACHIEVE BOTH A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF TURK-GREEK ISSUES AND WHY HE FEELS LIFTING THE EMBARGO WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THESE OBJECTIVES.

(C) WE HAVE BEEN FAVORABLY IMPRESSED WITH WHAT HE AND DENKTASH HAVE BEEN SAYING ABOUT TURKISH FLEXIBILITY ON CYPRUS. ON MAY 23 THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SPOKESMAN MADE SOME POSITIVE COMMENTS ALONG THESE LINES. IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL IF WHILE IN THE US HE COULD EMPHASIZE THE FLEXIBILITY IN THE DENKTASH STATEMENT AND INDICATE TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE HIS

DESIRE TO SEE REAL MOVEMENT ON VAROSHA, A REOPENING
OF NICOSIA AIRPORT, PERHAPS ADDITIONAL TROOP WITHDRAWALS,
OR EQUIVALENT SUBSTANTIVE, DRAMATIC GESTURES HE FEELS
ARE FEASIBLE.

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AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

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4. I CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT HE WAS WIDELY RECOGNIZED
AS TURKEY'S MOST ELOQUENT SPOKESMAN. HIS EXPOSITION
OF TURKEY'S HOPES AND OBJECTIVES SHOULD RECEIVE
A RESPONSIVE HEARING IN HIS SEVERAL PUBLIC
APPEARANCES IN US. I ASSURED HIM THAT OUR COMING TO
HIM WITH THESE SUGGESTIONS WAS INTENDED TO HELP
ACHIEVE OUR COMMON PURPOSES. I HAD BEEN ASKED TO
NOTE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WAS VERY MUCH LOOKING
FORWARD TO MEETING WITH HIM FOR A THOROUGH DISCUSSION
ON THESE MATTERS.

5. ECEVIT THANKED ME FOR THIS MESSAGE. HE SAID THAT
HE HAD BEEN STRESSING THESE SUGGESTED THEMES IN ANY
CASE AND THAT, ACCORDINGLY, SECRETARY'S SUGGESTIONS
WERE VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH HIS OWN THINKING. HE
ASKED IF I COULD INDICATE WHICH OF HIS RECENT STATEMENTS
ABOUT NATO CAUSED CONCERN. I SAID THAT IT WAS NOT SO
MUCH ANY SINGLE STATEMENT BUT A GENERAL IMPRESSION
THAT LEADS TO A QUESTIONING OF WHETHER HE WAS GENUINELY
INTERESTED IN LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO. STRESS HAD BEEN
PLACED IN PRESS ON TURKEY'S "NEW DEFENSE CONCEPT"
AND REORIENTATION OF TURKISH FORCES IMPLYING THAT
GREECE, RATHER THAN SOVIETS, WAS THE REAL ENEMY.
ECEVIT SAID THAT HE ASSUMED THAT SOME OF PROFESSOR
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SOYSAL'S STATEMENTS MIGHT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS IMPRESSION, BUT THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS INDICATIVE OF HIS OWN VIEWS. I NOTED MANY OF THE STRONGEST SUPPORTERS OF LIFTING EMBARGO WERE PROPONENTS OF A STRONG NATO AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THIS FACT IN HIS PRESENTATION. ECEVIT SAID THAT HIS APPROACH, AS WE KNEW, WAS DIFFERENT:

"WE DON'T WANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WILL BE THE END OF THE WORLD FOR TURKEY IF THE EMBARGO IS NOT LIFTED - WE WOULD LOSE OUR SELF ASSURANCE, ESTEEM IN THE EYES OF OUR NEIGHBORS AND OUR POPULATION COULD LOSE SELF CONFIDENCE. WE HAVE TO SURVIVE, TO PREPARE OURSELVES. THIS IS ONLY NATURAL, BUT I CAN UNDERSTAND HOW THIS COULD HAVE BEEN MISINTERPRETED PARTICULARLY TOGETHER WITH SOYSAL'S COMMENTS". ECEVIT CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE FOUND MY WORDS REASSURING. HE APPRECIATED THE INCREASED EFFORT THE ADMINISTRATION IS MAKING AND WILL MAKE. HE COULD EASILY AND POSITIVELY EXPRESS THE THEMES THE SECRETARY MENTIONED. I SAID THAT WHILE I WAS NOT IN FAVOR OF UNDUE PESSIMISM I WAS ALSO NOT IN FAVOR OF UNDUE OPTIMISM. THE BATTLE ON THE HILL WILL BE A DIFFICULT ONE AND WILL REQUIRE GREAT PRESIDENTIAL EFFORT. ECEVIT INDICATED HE RECOGNIZED THIS AND SAID "I HAVE NO HOPE WITHOUT A PRESIDENTIAL EFFORT".

6. IN CONCLUSION I NOTED THAT WE HAD HAD SOME INFORMAL INDICATIONS FROM THE GREEK CYPRIOTS THAT IF HE, DENKTASH AND KYPRIANOU COULD MEET TOGETHER, THIS COULD LEAD TO RESUMPTION OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. I SAID THAT WAS NOT AN IDEA THAT WE ARE SPONSORING

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BUT THAT I WANTED TO PASS IT ALONG TO HIM FOR HIS OWN EVALUATION OF WHATEVER POSSIBILITIES IT MIGHT PRESENT. ECEVIT REACTED IMMEDIATELY BY ASKING WHETHER SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE "WITHOUT KARAMANLIS" HE WOULD NOT FIND THE REASONING BEHIND THIS SUGGESTION "PLEASANT". KYPRIANOU HAD CONSTANTLY TRIED TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH HIM. I NOTED THAT IN THIS INSTANCE DENKTASH WOULD ALSO BE A PARTICIPANT AND THIS MIGHT THROW A DIFFERENT LIGHT ON IT. ECEVIT ONLY SAID "IF KARAMANLIS WERE THERE" IT WOULD BE A DIFFERENT

PROPOSITION. GLITMAN

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